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Abstract: The article presents the methodology for quantitative risk assessment, which was mainly 
directed towards the assessment of explosion risks at workplaces. The methodology is 
based on the principles of functional safety to be able to determine quantitatively the level 
of risk for typical manufacturing processes. 
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Introduction
All industrial installations working in potentially 
explosive atmospheres, in industries such as 
energetic, chemistry, food processing and storage 
and others are generally supplied with protective, 
detecting, alarming devices preventing explosion 
occurrence or effectively mitigating it, if explosion 
appears. Explosion event for a given installation 
occurs rarely, sometimes never in the life cycle 
and that is a reason to assure the highest level of 
reliability of protective devices. The main principles 
of such reliability is given by the functional 
safety concept generally defi ned according to 
(IEC-EN 61508, 2008) as the part of the overall 
safety that depends on a system or equipment 
operating correctly in response to its inputs. The 
details of the functional safety concept are given 
in the European Standard EN 61-508 “Functional 
Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable 
Electronic Safety-related Systems (E/E/PE, or 
E/E/PES). According to the spirit of this standard 
functional safety could be understood as the detection 
of a potentially dangerous condition resulting in the 
activation of a protective or corrective device or 
mechanism to prevent hazardous events arising or 
providing mitigation to reduce the fi ght consequence 
of the hazardous event. This idea is realized in 
the standard EN 15 233, 2007, "Methodology 
for functional safety assessment of protective 
systems for potentially explosive atmospheres" 
(EN-15233, 2009). This standard formulate 
defi nition of functional safety as” a part of the 
overall safety relating to the intended use in terms 
of the function and integrity of the protective system 
including any safety related devices that are part of 
the protective system performance”. This defi nition 
deviates from the defi nition in EN 61508-4 to refl ect 
differences in explosion safety terminology.
Such defi nition covers all aspects where safety 
depends on the correct functioning of the protective 
system and other technology safety-related systems. 
These standards formulate the general requirements 
of functional safety and their universal nature makes 
them more widely adopted to improve modern risk 
management systems.
Materials and methods
Explosion risk assessment in practice 
Fig. 1 presents the general principles of risk 
assessment for designing of protective system. The 
scheme relates not only for explosion protection but 
generally to every protection system. 
Fig. 1 Functional safety assessment of protective 
systems in explosion hazardous areas (EN 15233, 
2009)
The method of adapting the approach of these 
standards to assess the effects of catastrophic 
events has been proposed in the methodology of 
the ARAMIS project (Accidental Risk Assessment 
Methodology for Industries) (Salvi and Debray, 
2006), realized the Fifth Framework Program. The 
project concerned the principles of quantitative 
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risk assessment for disaster prevention mainly in 
the chemical industry, and it was associated with 
the need to implement the safety requirements of 
the Seveso II Directive. Using the experience of 
ARAMIS proposed a method of risk assessment 
for explosion was proposed. In this paper the case 
of dust explosion will be considered generally and 
example of coal dust explosion in underground mine 
will be presented. For dust explosion hazard the 
following dust properties are taken into account: dust 
substances fl ammability, dispersabillity of dust, dust 
settling in workplaces, the presence of combustible 
gases in the atmosphere. According to the general 
safety philosophy adopted in the European Union, 
the risk acceptance criteria are defi ned according to 
the principle ALARP - "As Low As is Reasonably 
practicable" - as low as is reasonably justifi ed. 
ALARP principle was fi rst introduced in the UK and 
there has been best described.
In ALARP there are three basic risk levels:
- Unacceptable (intolerable) risk - the risk level 
above which the work cannot be done. In such 
a case, the installation must be, rebuilt, completed 
with devices and systems of risk reduction.
- Acceptable risk - the risk perceived as 
insignifi cant. Acceptable risk is similar to the risks 
of everyday life. It is assumed, however, that if it 
is possible to reduce the risk in this respect, it shall 
be reduced in accordance with ALARP principle.
- Tolerable risk - is the range in which the risk is 
acceptable if it meets the ALARP principle.
The proposal to adapt the ALARP rules for 
explosion risk assessment in hazardous areas at 
work is summarized in Tab. 1 and 2.
Tab. 1 Risk level classifi cation depending on the 
frequency of events and their consequences leading 
to development of hazardous scenario
Separate consequences categories are defi ned as 
follows: 
- Disastrous - collective accident with fatalities, 
permanent exclusion of work place. 
- Critical - serious and collective accidents without 
fatalities, professional diseases, temporary 
exclusion of work place.
- Marginal - lightweight accident, catarrh of upper 
respiratory tracts, losses do not causing work 
place excluding.
- Negligible - quasi accidental events not causing of 
work place excluding.
Risk levels I to IV presented in the Tab. 1 
result directly from ALARP principle and their 
interpretation is shown in Tab. 2.
Tab. 2 Risk level interpretation
In practice it is necessary to achieve the level 
III - tolerable risk with objective to achieve the 
level IV - acceptable risk, being the main objective 
of risk reduction. In case of explosion hazards it is 
necessary to approach to the following frequencies 
of hazard activation (confi dence level):
- Dust explosions - 10-7 - 10-8 hazardous events/
year.
- Igniting and gas explosion - 10-6 - 10-8. 
Dust explosions, particularly in underground 
coal mines are diffi cult to be handled 
and bring disastrous consequences. 
Gases are easier to be detected and 
removed by ventilation. To predict 
the hazardous scenario it is useful 
to use the analytical methods, the 
Best Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA). Aramis 
methodology proposes the algorithm 
leading to the construction of 
Bow-Tie Tree - joining Fault Tree 
and Event Tree. Analysis should be 
done in 7 following steps:
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Occurrence 
Probability 
(qualitatively)
Frequency 
(number 
of event/
year)
Consequences 
Disastrous Critical Marginal Negligible
Frequently >10-3 I I I II
Likely <10-3 - 10-5 I I II III
In some cases <10-5 - 10-6 I II III III
Rarely <10-6 - 10-7 II III III IV
Unlikely <10-7 - 10-8 III III IV IV
Almost 
impossible <10
-8 IV IV IV IV
Risk level Interpretation
Level I Range of intolerable risk
Level II 
Risk acceptable only in case of big technical 
diffi culties of risk reduction, or in case of 
costs unproportional relating to achieved 
safety improvement 
Level III Tolerable risk if costs of its reduction are adequate to the achieved safety level a.  
Level IV Range of acceptable risk
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- Step 1 - gather information needed.
- Step 2 - identify the potentially dangerous situation 
in the factory. 
- Step 3 - determine the primary hazards bound with 
these situation. 
- Step 4 - defi ne the primary event for every such 
situation. 
- Step 5 - built the fault tree from primary events 
and lead it to the critical event. 
- Step 6 - built the event tree for every critical event. 
- Step 7 - establish the principles of protection and 
prevention for every stage of hazard development.
Fig. 2 Bow-Tie scenario of hazardous event 
development
If the bow-tie tree the following symbols is used:
- PH - primary hazard, for example occurrence of 
fl ammable gases or dusts.
- IE - initiating event, for example insuffi cient 
ventilation, machine failure, gas leaks, unreliable 
gas monitoring.
- CE - critical event - for example - intensive gas 
leak, failure of welding apparatus, deposited 
fl ammable dust.
- SCE - secondary critical events, for example 
- occurrence of explosible gas concentration , 
occurrence of ignition sources.
- AE - accidental event - for example gas and/or 
dust explosion, accident, fatality.
To prevent the dangerous scenario development 
it is necessary to assure the respective functional 
safety level by applying of Layer of Protection 
or Safety Layers understood as properly chosen 
methods of prevention and protection leading to 
limitation of primary event and initiating event. It 
is also necessary to take into account the mutual 
interaction of different kinds of hazard.
Selection of Protection Layers and 
estimation of their functionality
Fig. 3 Layer of protection - example for coal mine 
explosion
General objectives of protection layer against 
explosion are: avoiding, preventing, monitoring, 
mitigating. There are the following types of 
protection layers (or protective barriers):
- Physical, softening the explosion effects; there are 
passive physical barriers such as walls, stoppings , 
bulkheads , barriers and those requiring activation 
as fi re curtains.
- Functional - electric, electronic, controlling the 
processes in the given range of parameters.
- Functional - electronically programmable - which 
halt undesirable process conduct by the operation 
defi ned by the logical or temporal coupling. 
Activation of these measures does not require 
human intervention and its safety features are 
independent of the control system.
- Symbolic - which require the proper interpretation 
to achieve the objectives of their destination. 
There are various types of conventional signs, 
symbols and signals indicating the state.
- Human related - which depend on the knowledge 
and experience of the operator. Typical intangible 
protective measures are national regulations or 
internal requirements, instructions, rules for safe 
handling (safety culture).
To achieve the desired risk level, every event 
in the bow-tie tree must be examined branch after 
branch for responses to the question „whether the 
proposed protective layer permits to avoid, prevent, 
control or limit this event?“. If the answer is yes, 
then you should include specifi c protective layer 
to a specifi c branch of the bow-tie. Layer will be 
placed „upstream“ toward the event, if you prevent 
or to avoid the occurrence of a particular event. If its 
task is to control or limit a specifi c event, it must be 
placed according to the sequence diagram, running 
events.
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External operational and rescue procedures
Safety procedures, internal rescue procedures
Barriers
Ignition sources control
Supervizing critical alarming
Monitoring               system
Production
processes
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The barrier confi dence level LC (Level of 
Confi dence) is defi ned as the probability of failure or 
an incorrect response to required safety functions. The 
confi dence level should be estimated for the whole 
protective layer (not for a single barrier). The specifi c 
protective layer may consist of many, if necessary, the 
various subsystems (sensors, management system, 
procedures and mechanisms of conduct for specifi c 
processes). For each subsystem must be assessed 
level of confi dence, effi ciency and response time. 
Quantifi cation of these three components allows 
the calculation of the overall confi dence level of 
safety barriers. The methodology of the quantitative 
expression of the confi dence level to each LC protective 
barriers was based on the methodology described 
in Standard EN 61 508 focused on determining the 
safety integrity level SIL (Safety Integrity Level) 
for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic 
safety-related devices (IEC-EN 61508, 2008).
The values of confi dence levels are given in the 
Tab. 3.
Tab. 3 Recommended values of confi dence levels 
according to EN 61508 for separate safety barriers 
resulting from applied prevention and protection 
measures
Examples of confi dence level for three types of 
safety barriers- physical, functional and human in 
coal mines are given in tables 4, 5, 6.
Tab. 4 Confi dence level for selected physical passive 
barriers (based on accidents analysis)
These barriers are acts continuously with limited 
human action, generally do not need sophisticated 
information about existing hazards.
Tab. 5 Confi dence level for selected functional 
safety barriers (based on industrial data analysis)
Those are active barriers, built of the three main 
subsystems: Detection (D), signal processing or 
treatment (T) and action either automatic or human.
Example of human related protective layers 
are internal regulations and safety procedures like 
rules of gas concentration control, maintenance of 
ventilation system and so on. General view of human 
related confi dence level is given in Tab. 6.
Tab. 6 Examples of human action confi dence level
Identifi cation of safety barriers, to be included in 
a bow-tie tree should be done with the participation of 
employees (operators, safety inspectors, employees 
of the establishment, etc.), analyzing the processes 
and equipment used.
The checklist helps to identify the functions of 
the various protective layers and safety barriers in 
the tree, bow-tie. It can also be used to identify the 
type of activities to be implemented in a new or 
modifi ed process in order to improve the existing 
level of security. Each identifi ed protective layer (or 
barrier) must meet all the requirements set before 
it. Defi ned only as protective, layers can be used 
when constructing scenarios of failure events. The 
confi dence level estimated using the methodology 
discussed above is a "proposed" level of confi dence. 
This means that all the proposed protective layers 
(or its individual barrier) are at least as effective as 
a barrier actually installed. You should also consider 
the possibility of reducing the effectiveness of 
the protective layer over time, due for example to 
changes in organization and management system. 
Becomes important to take into account the impact 
of the safety management system on the functioning 
of the protective layers.
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Confi dence 
level
Coeffi cient of 
risk reduction
Probability of failure 
or incorrect action
4 10 000 >10-5 do <10-4
3 1 000 >10-4 do <10-3
2 100 >10-3 do <10-2
1 10 >10-2 do <10-1
Material Safety 
Level 
Probability 
of failure or 
incorrect action
Confi dence 
Level 
Automatic 
extinguishing systems >10
-2 do <10-1 1
Neutralization or 
removing of dust >10
-2 do <10-1 1
Dust collector on the 
machine >10
-2 do <10-1 1
Central dust 
collecting system >10
-3 do <10-2 2
Functional Safety 
Layer
Probability 
of failure or 
incorrect action
Confi dence 
level (LC)
Automatic methane 
monitoring system i
>10-3 do <10-2 2
Automatic CO 
monitoring system
>10-3 do <10-2 2
Human related 
safety level
Probability 
of failure or 
incorrect action
Confi dence 
level (LC)
Prevention >10-3 do <10-2 2
Normal action >10-3 do <10-2 2
Intervention >10-2 do <10-1 1
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Results
The article presents the methodology for 
quantitative risk assessment, which was mainly 
directed towards the assessment of explosion 
risks at workplaces. The methodology is based 
on the principles of functional safety to be able to 
determine quantitatively the level of risk for typical 
manufacturing processes The methodology consists 
of the following steps:
- determine based on the of ALARP principle, risk 
acceptability criteria, quantitative measures for 
the production processes,
- defi ne hazardous scenarios of events leading to 
accidents and incidents, and covering the technical 
and human threats,
- determine protective barriers to prevent the 
development of specifi c event scenarios (barriers 
relating to methods of prevention and protection ),
- determine quantitatively the degree of confi dence 
to the individual protective barriers based 
on the methodology of determining SIL for 
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic 
safety-related,
- development of management principles to ensure 
the maintenance under the control of the risks by 
ensuring the effective functioning of the protective 
barriers.
Conclusion
For the presented methodology gained credibility 
and has become a common tool for risk assessment, it 
should be implemented gradually with the following 
conditions:
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a) all processes should be carefully studied based 
on the best knowledge in this fi eld in order to 
anticipate potential hazardous events and their 
probability,
b) should be used: the current state of knowledge 
to be able accurately estimate the effects of 
hazards on the work environment, all available 
information, particularly those that are useful in 
deciding on activities to secure the development 
of the factory,
c) use the most recent available data on material 
properties, process parameters, indicators of 
reliability of equipment and human factors,
d) work in a transparent manner to allow to explore 
both the external supervisors and workers 
concerned with the scale of the risks analyzed and 
the resulting consequences,
e) the results should be used in the analysis of 
similar systems, installations, or processes,
f) the methodology should be transformed and 
continuously improved, with the development 
of methods for estimating risk, improve safety 
management systems, emergency systems and 
emergency response to the potentially affected 
areas,
g) when assessing the risk of explosion and applying 
the principles of functional safety for protection 
against dust explosion it is necessary  to break 
away from the "mentality of the gas," and not 
to seek an analogy with explosive gases. This 
applies especially to the concept of explosion 
limits.
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